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Abstract: The election of 1994 radically changed the environment within which
management chose its labour control policies. Prior to the change of government in
1994 plant practices were shaped by the fact of substantial protection against
foreign competition, widespread illiteracy, and a set of laws and policies that offered
few protections for individual workers or organised labour. Since the change in
government the political and legal environment has substantially changed. In this
paper we report on management practices before and after the political changes in
South Africa in a set of plants in a part of the country where many of the current
difficulties of the South African economy exist in a fairly extreme form.
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Contemporary South Africa provides an opportunity for studying the
effects of social institutions on employer approaches to the management of
their workforces. Before the 1994 election that brought the African
National Congress (ANC) to power, consecutive National Party govern-
ments created a generally authoritarian environment that gave manage-
ments one set of options. Those options changed dramatically after the
election.
The authors of this paper took advantage of a brief window of research
opportunity that became available to them to interview managers in seven
plants in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province, during February and
March 1997. The change in the environment was still recent, so it was
possible to gather data on how plant managements had dealt with their
work forces before and after the political change. Five of the plants were in
the major East Cape cities – East London and Port Elizabeth – and two
within the former Ciskei, a mainly rural area that had been one of the
formally independent ‘Homelands’ established by the previous National
Party government. In each plant one or more managers was interviewed
for up to two hours, followed or preceded by a tour of the plant. All the
plants were unionised. They were selected to represent the range of
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industries present in the region. They had the characteristics summarised
in Table 1. All had both male and female production workers but males
were predominant in the first four and females in the last three. An
interview was also conducted with a small group of union officials from
the textile industry.1
In what follows we describe the salient features of the institutional
environment before and after 1994, how labour was managed in our
sample plants in both contexts, and the main outcomes of the changed
managerial approach.
Before 1994
First, the bulk of the labour force was deprived of political power. Con-
sequently, effective legislative protections for employees were negligible.
Second, the government sought to industrialise through import substi-
tution (Bonner et al. 1993:8). Tariffs were set to protect larger producers
within industries, producing a highly concentrated economy. Exports were
substantially aided by export subsidies (see Fransman 1982; McCarthy
1988). Consequently, most manufacturing cannot currently meet world
competition. Third, illiteracy rates within the adult black population have
been estimated at about 45 per cent (Joffe 1995: 187; for broad evidence
on educational deficiencies see also Wilson 1996: 324; Thomas 1996).
Fourth, whatever differences in preferences and attitudes between
Africans and whites already existed when the National Party came to
power in 1948 were nurtured by apartheid policies. To the extent that they
were effective (and they certainly had effect), policies of separate educa-
tion, separate residence, and political exclusion magnified social differ-
ences between managers and white workers, on the one hand, and the
majority African work force, on the other. Fifth, the government’s
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Table 1 Sample Characteristics
Production Trend in
Industry Employees Staff Total Employment
A Process industry 270 47 Down from a total of 370
B Automobiles 2750 750 Down from about 4500
C Automobile components 450 150 Some increase
D Automobile components 60 27 Down from a total of
about 150
E Textiles 1500 300 Down from about 3000
F Specialty textiles 480 128 Some increase, plus
added subcontractors
G Garment 250–280 12 Maximum of over 300
statutory approach to labour relations combined a consistently inter-
ventionist approach to the white workforce with an approach to African
workers that shifted from initial exclusion to, later, largely ineffective
attempts at inclusion. This warrants elaboration.
The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act embodied the interventionist
approach. It created Industrial Councils designed to centralise bargaining
at the industry level. But the provisions of the Act applied to ‘employees’,
defined to exclude the population regulated by the Native Pass Laws –
that is, Africans. Nonetheless, from the 1970s the membership of African
trade unions that were independent of the established, white-dominated
unions expanded rapidly. In response, reforms inspired by the 1979
Wiehahn Report attempted to deracialise the industrial relations system.
African unions could be recognised and register. After initial reticence
most did so, substantially changing the operation of the Industrial
Councils. These became less ‘clubs’ representing the interests of
employers and a minority of skilled, white, workers and more an area of
broadly based contestation between industrial unions and employers. This
implied a tentative step towards the institutionalisation of labour relations.
Nonetheless, the tentativeness of these steps should be emphasised.
During the 1980s the extent to which industrial conflict was regulated by
Industrial Councils diminished, as bargaining shifted to the plant level
and, from 1985–1995, some 20 per cent of Councils ceased to function
altogether (Wood 1998: 48). Moreover while, in the wake of the Wiehahn
Report, an Industrial Court was established with the right to adjudicate
cases of unfair labour practices brought to it, including dismissals of legal
strikers, in practice, the decisions of the Industrial Court, while incon-
sistent, moved away from the more generous spirit that lay behind the
initial legislation (Wakfer 1993). Besides, illegal strike action increased, for
which management retained the option of dismissing workers or drawing
on the coercive arm of the state (Keenan 1981: 5–10). By the early to mid
1980s African trade unions had increasingly assumed a social movement
role, using shop floor influence to mobilise against government policies.
Reflecting the failure of institutionalisation, the strike rate in South Africa
became one of the highest in the world (Webster 1987: 217).
After 1994
The ANC victory in the 1994 election removed the keystone of the
authoritarian environment of labour relations. The most important
expression of the new approach was the Industrial Relations Act 1995. It
included the following provisions. First Bargaining Council (the former
Industrial Councils) agreements can be extended to non-member firms,
where a firm’s non-participation might undermine sectoral bargaining
(Benjamin 1995: 45). Second, the Act incorporates earlier Industrial
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Court Decisions. Employers have to prove that any dismissal is both
procedurally and substantively fair. Decisions not to renew temporary
employment contracts are also held to a standard of substantive fairness.
Third, there is provision for the establishment of Workplace Forums
within which consultation might take place on issues like new technology,
workplace restructuring, plant closure, mergers or transfers of ownership,
retrenchments, job grading, criteria for merit pay bonuses, education and
training, product development plans, export promotion, and any other
responsibility conferred by a Bargaining Council. They provide for joint
decision-making over disciplinary codes and procedures, measures to
protect those thought to be subject to discrimination, changes concerning
benefit schemes (pensions, health insurance, etc.), and workplace rules
not related to the actual work performance of employees. In principle,
they provide a venue within which employers and employees might co-
operate in the improvement of plant performance.
Finally, while there is as yet no statutory obligation to do so, employers
are under some pressure to implement affirmative action policies – directed
at any underrepresented group but, in particular, African employees.
The problems employers experience in coming to terms with a radically
changed labour relations environment have been compounded by a major
economic change. The last agreement of GATT required South Africa to
dismantle its system of trade barriers and subsidies. Managers in the
exposed sector in South Africa can no longer allow their work organization
to be inefficient, by international standards.
The Management of Labour before 1994
Apartheid implied a radical difference in management approaches to
white and black employees. In the plants we studied, artisans – crafts-
men – were almost all white. Their importance varied across the plants,
depending on the amount of equipment to be maintained. It was greatest
in the process plant, followed by the automobile plant and the textile mill.
The employment of artisans raises two broad issues of flexibility: job
demarcations, and the extent to which maintenance tasks – which vary in
volume over time – are subcontracted. Practices in the plants we studied
were generally restrictive. Unionised artisans had refused to work outside
their trades at both process plant A and automobile plant B. At specialty
textile mill F, multiskilling was not considered because implementing it
‘would cost money’. Subcontracting was less of an issue but not because
management had latitude to subcontract maintenance. Rather, major
maintenance in the process plant (an industry requiring a large main-
tenance effort) was conducted by the existing labour force, supplemented
with workers from other company plants when extra labour was required.
In sum, where artisan labour was important and unionised, there
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appeared to have been restrictions on its use equal to or greater than those
Osterman (1988) treated as evidence of distinct inflexibility in North
American industry.
While in all but one plant artisans, or equivalent skilled workers, were
white, the bulk of the manual labour force was African.2 It was clear that
the pre-1994 approach to African employees had been ‘hierarchical and
authoritarian’ (Joffe et al. 1995: 187). At process plant A, we were told,
employees had been yelled at and pushed around. At other plants the
evidence was more indirect. Human resource managers, who clearly had a
missionary role within the organisation on this issue, referred to an
‘incomplete change’ (or words to that effect) in the approach of super-
visors. The old style was no longer feasible. It lingered on with the less
adaptive supervisors, and seems to have looked rather like the ‘driving
method’ that Taylor set out to replace at the end of the nineteenth century
(see Nelson 1975: 43–44). As in the industrial revolution (Pollard 1963),
the authority of supervisors was buttressed by the right to fire for cause,
apparently more or less at will. Notwithstanding the provisions of the post
Wiehahn legislation, discretionary dismissal remained a major element of
management’s armoury.
None of this should be construed to mean that the African work force
was reduced to tractable automatons. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The incidence of industrial disputes rose during the 1980s,
remaining high after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. All the plants we
visited had experienced significant strikes in the period before 1994, as
well as stayaways – short political strikes, usually nationally organised.
Without parliamentary representation, African protest against apartheid
was transferred to the industrial arena. But the congenial political environ-
ment did create some options for at least some managements. At garment
factory G, located away from the East Cape cities in an industrial estate
within the former Ciskei, the owner-manager reported that before the
unionisation of the plant, in the late 1980s, he would respond to labour
problems by bringing in the police and labour department officials who
would (in some way that he did not specify) take care of the problems. In
fact, we know that a visit to the plant from the police would have had
effect. During Ciskie’s years of ‘independence’ it was quite common for
the authorities to detain trade union members and officials classified as
‘troublesome’ (Work in Progress 1982: 49–55).
Notwithstanding substantial discretion with respect to discipline, there
is still the problem: how do managers ensure that they have a labour force
with suitable skills? This is a matter of recruitment and training. Recruit-
ment, however, seems not to have been very selective. The principal route
into the sample factories was through family connections. Recruitment
appears to have operated through the extended networks of support in the
African community that we discuss later (see also Hyden 1983). Because
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it offers rates of pay and working conditions that are much better than
those available to comparable employees in the local labour market, the
number of applicants to automobile plant A had been huge. Con-
sequently, its recruitment process was distinctively structured. It con-
sidered family members, but put them through a battery of tests before
hiring them. In the other plants, ease of firing seems to have been
associated with relatively non-selective hiring. There was a structured
process at garment factory G. Candidates for new jobs were tested if they
claimed sewing skills. Those applying without skills were hired at a
probationary rate for three months, during which time they were trained
by a plant technician, and given progressively more difficult tasks to do.
At automobile components plant D the relevant skills (welding and
upholstering) were not sufficiently available in the local labour market and
they had to train. In the rest of the sample, training seems to have been
rather crude. In process plant A the method for training operators was
described as ‘sit next to Nellie’. This had also been the main method at
the automobile plant B. At the large textile plant more skilled operator
jobs were filled through immigration. Training for the larger number of
less skilled jobs was through demonstration. Overall, the training offered
before 1994 seems to have been, at best, patchy.
In summary, functional flexibility was limited within both the white and
African labour forces: among the whites because of aggressive assertion of
craft privileges; among the Africans because their education and training
limited the way they could be used. At the same time, though manage-
ment retained the capacity to maintain discipline through dismissal, its
authority was frequently contested through legal and illegal strikes.
Managing Labour in the New Environment
In 1997 the artisans in the plants in our sample were still overwhelmingly
white. They remained a separate, relatively privileged, group. But they had
become a still more acute problem for management. Before, the
demarcations that they had enforced obstructed productivity. At the time
of our interviews, as well as limiting functional flexibility, the artisans were
hard to integrate into the plant’s developing labour relations framework.
Most remained aloof from African-dominated unions, either remaining
non-union or, in textile plant E, belonging to a different union. The
pressure for affirmative action made it necessary to advance Africans. A
peculiarity of the South African organisation of craft work provided one
route for accomplishing this. As in other industries, white artisans in
process plant A were provided with African artisan aids. These would have
picked up many artisan skills. Management had begun to train those
capable up to something like an artisan level. In the wider economy,
however, the fact that Africans trained in craft skills would have to work
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with a distinctly conservative set of white artisans decreased the attractive-
ness to them of that particular career route (Haines and Wood 1995:
608–609).
The more immediate problem was that of dealing with an African
labour force when police could no longer be counted on to support
management, the use of lock-outs was circumscribed, and the right to
dismiss limited. Piece rates are a standard solution to incentive problems.
‘Under such a contract, the supervisor is largely freed from the burden of
enforcing detailed rules and regulations on increasingly resentful
employees’ (Miller 1992: 105). All the better, then, when the workforce is
generally and profoundly resentful, at the outset. There was payment by
the piece at specialty textiles plant F. There was a hybrid system at
garment factory G: a base rate with additional payment for each
completed piece. And a piece rate system was under development in
components plant D, where most production jobs involved stand-alone
welding or upholstering operations. But piece work is not feasible where
output cannot be individually attributed – on assembly lines and in
process industries, for example. Besides, there are forms of indiscipline
that undermine productivity that piece rates do not address. Absenteeism
was a major problem in all but one of the plants we visited and, even if
unpaid, absences can wreak havoc with production schedules.
The changed environment demanded innovations in management prac-
tices. Most basically, encouraged by their human resource managers,
white supervisors were being induced to approach the African labour force
with something approaching civility. But the habits of a lifetime are not
easily overcome. Despite training, the change had been slow and in-
complete. At the same time, supervisors had to be trained with respect to
the appropriate procedures to be used under the new law when they
intended to dismiss. Management did not intend to abandon entirely dis-
missal as a disciplinary option. But its (less frequent) use required
procedural correctness: documentation of the incidence of the cause for
dismissal, initial provision of assistance to overcome problems producing
the offenses, and consecutive warnings.
Management had three other options for dealing with the changed
environment: appointing African supervisors; building enthusiasm, loyalty,
and teamwork among African workers; and using the union to control the
workforce. We consider these in turn.
Management was seeking to appoint Africans to first line supervisory
posts in all seven plants but was encountering two problems. It was not
easy, our respondents said, to find enough suitably talented Africans. This
response need not have been pure racism. Past exclusion of African
workers from decision-making and the inferior education that had been
available to most of them would have limited the size of the available
talent pool. There is, however, a group who have developed leadership
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skills: trade union officials. In specialty textile plant F the only African
supervisor whom the production manager regarded as a success (in fact, a
very great success indeed) was a former shop steward. The appointment
of trade union officials to supervisory positions is a fairly frequent occur-
rence. The official of SACTWU (Southern African Clothing and Textile
Workers Union) whom we interviewed complained bitterly about it. It
appears to generate widespread resentment among the union rank and
file. Over time, the appointment of Africans into management positions
may improve the capacity to control labour in the changed environment.
But the process is, probably inevitably, fairly slow.
The other problem, according to several managers, was that African
supervisors, even if capable and willing, were in no position to exercise
discipline. Supervisors would live in the same townships or rural areas as
some of the people they supervised. Apartheid increased the average
distance between workers and their workplaces. Transportation is
provided in ‘taxis’: minivans into which perhaps ten passengers can be
crammed. An hour’s journey to a township in a taxi shared by a discipliner
and a disciplinee would be a fairly fraught experience. Moreover, law and
order is distinctly problematic in many townships, and an African super-
visor who disciplined an African employee, it was said, risked retaliatory
violence. Indeed, the deeply entrenched culture of non-collaboration and
political resistance in the townships might well lend legitimacy to retalia-
tion against an authority figure (see Hindson 1987: 211–17).
Another management option is to use measures to engage the loyalty of
the workforce. This can be accomplished in several ways. One is to make
possible higher pay through skill upgrading. Training opportunities for
Africans had expanded in all the plants, except garment factory G, which
already had a programme for training sewing machine operators, and
component plant C, where management was still grappling with the
problem of training a workforce with low literacy levels. Specialty textiles
plant F had tripled its training budget. Process plant A had devised a
programme for production trainees that involving rotation across several
operating ‘disciplines’ within the plant. Automobile plant B now recruited
operators into apprenticeships, had established a training centre for
general skill upgrading, and maintained a large employee reserve so that
significant numbers could be withdrawn from production and trained.
Both components plant D and textile plant E had developed training
schemes that would bring certification from an Industry Training Board.
As a complement to upgraded training, textile factory E was also
attempting to construct career paths, by identifying plausible sequences of
jobs, and the skills attached to each. Other plants were considering the
construction of production worker careers, but had made little progress is
doing so. In practice, management retained considerable discretion with
respect to promotion decisions.
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In any case, even in a line of progression of the sort commonly found in
North America, promotions are insufficiently frequent to motivate
adequately (Smith 1997). An alternate route to engaging the loyalty of the
work force is through the creation of some sort of team spirit, in the
pursuit of production goals. Component plant C seemed to have been the
most successful and imaginative in this respect. The workforce had been
divided into teams, each assigned a ‘minibusiness area’. Covering,
perhaps, twelve square metres, they were spread along the walls of the
plant, separated by partitions. The first ten minutes of the working day
were devoted to discussions of the preceding day’s problems. The areas
are plastered with inspirational slogans. We were told that in about 60 per
cent of the factory these had been very successful. Supervisory defi-
ciencies had reduced their effectiveness in the remainder. There was a
participation programme at components producer D that involved decen-
tralising responsibilities (e.g. a fork lift truck driver might make main-
tenance decisions about his truck) and areas of collaboration between
operators and artisans had been specified. The construction of groups
made up of operators and artisans was also the route taken at process
plant A. At textile plants E and F there had been only modest moves to
establish teams. At automobile components plant D the company distri-
buted t-shirts, sponsored sports teams, and sent birthday cards to its
employees – a whole range of efforts to construct at work something more
like a community. Here, again, while there had been progress in
developing an employee relations approach that came to terms with the
changed environment, the changes were slow to have effect. There were
more immediate problems that required solving.
In the short run, the most important resource available to management
for securing compliant behaviour had been the union. Take the case of
garment factory G. The 1995 Act required warnings before dismissal, for
all but the most serious offences. Workers are supposed to acknowledge
those warnings by signing them. But at the garment factory workers who
had been warned refused to comply. So the law allowed the oral delivery
of the warning, with the shop steward as witness. Under the law, a final,
pretermination, warning must be signed by someone. If the shop steward
refused to sign in the stead of the employee’s being warned, the branch
union secretary would be brought in to compel the union official to do so.
At this factory discipline depended on the union. At specialty textile mill
F the last politically motivated strike had been settled by the shop
stewards. At component plant C union officials participate in job
regrading, and management refrains from forcing through a regrading
opposed by the union representatives. At process plant A the union was
called in to mediate a refusal of the work force to operate machines at the
speed management thought the new investments warranted.
The other side of this particular coin, however, is that the pressures on
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union officials had increased greatly. They were now more accom-
modating than their memberships. They had recognised (according to the
manager of components plant D) that productivity mattered. But if they
were overly accommodating they were voted out of office. This, in fact,
had happened to an entire, more-or-less cooperative, union executive at
automobile plant B. Similar purges of shop stewards have occurred at
other South African plants (Wood 1998: 115). The problem was com-
pounded by the fact that the more talented shop stewards had been
drained off into political or managerial appointments, leaving responsi-
bilities to less experienced replacements. In this, as in most other respects,
the specialty textile plant had been most successful. The plant manager
reported that he made it a matter of policy to allow the union officials to
publicly and conspicuously win some battles, so that they could preserve
their support.
Outcomes of Changed Management Policies
In one respect, labour relations in the new South Africa had improved.
The political strike – the ‘stayaway’ – had almost disappeared. This did
not yet indicate the abandonment of broader concerns on the part of the
local unions. Process plant A belonged to a South African multinational
that had bought an American company. Its American division was in
difficult negotiations over job demarcation issues. Shortly before our
interview the union at plant A staged a short sympathy strike in support of
its American counterpart. (One tends to think that reciprocal support
from the American trade union members would be rather unlikely!) But
this was exceptional.
Moreover, despite the radical change in their environment, all the
plants in our sample were still operating. Circumstances had not led them
to the radical disinvestment implied by a plant closure. However, several
plants had reduced the number of shifts they operated. The automobile
plant, for example, would have preferred to operate with three shifts,
around the clock, but was reduced to one in most of the plant, and two in
one section. Garment factory G presented a different form of potential
disinvestment. The owner-manager had permanent residence status in
another country, his child was being educated in that country, and it was
clear that plant closure, while not inevitable, was in the range of possible
options he was considering. At process plant A the problem had been
posed in a different way. Belonging to a major South African multi-
national with a strong capital base, the plant was backed by sufficient
resources to eliminate short-run cash flow problems. But this plant,
producing a standardised commodity, widely available on international
markets, was already feeling the effects of liberalised trade. In the previous
winter a number of orders from regular customers had not come in. It
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turned out that a European competitor had been able to deliver at a
noticeably lower price.
The plants in our sample, then, displayed some economic precarious-
ness. Several productivity-damaging problems likely to produce this
turned up in our interviews. First, there was absenteeism. All but one of
the plants reported high and damaging levels. Its effects were made even
more negative because high rates were episodic. Absences tended to be
high on Mondays and Fridays. But from time to time they would increase
unpredictably on other days of the week. Specialty textile plant F, how-
ever, had managed to deal with the problem. Uniquely, they reported
having reduced absenteeism to an acceptable level: about two per cent,
down from over six per cent, three years earlier. They had accomplished
this by putting pressure on doctors who, they (and every other manager
we interviewed) were convinced, issued sick notes irresponsibly, either for
cash or under intimidation.3 None of the other plants had resolved the
problem. The most common response had been to incur the costs of
overstaffing to cover for absences, or use overtime to make up the lost
output.
Second, there was a problem of industrial discipline at some of the
plants. Process plant A provides the extreme example. Its manager
reported that, since the introduction of the protections provided by the
new law, productivity had fallen by 25 per cent. Like process industries in
general, this plant is highly capital intensive. A problem, he claimed, was
that workers associated their pay with a particular level of output. The
plant had recently upgraded part of its equipment. But, with the new
equipment, employees reduced their effort, on the grounds that their pay
was tied to a particular level of output. This may be regarded as a
particular manifestation of a more general problem of trust. There were
other examples of this. When the process plant announced some
temporary layoffs, the entire plant struck, contesting the claim that the
layoffs were warranted. Only when the union was shown detailed plant
sales records did the workers stop the strike. At textile plant E a clerical
error in pay packets also produced a strike. The employees would not
accept that the error would be made up the following working day.
(Finding the extra cash was complicated by the fact that the banks were
closed when the clerical error was discovered.)
Third, progress in improving the quality and loyalty of the African
labour force through training was seriously impeded by deficiencies in
basic education and, more particularly, literacy. At plant F, a highly
selective recruitment process and remedial training had minimised the
problem. More typical, however was the experience of process plant A
where increased skills would require reading graphs. But the educational
weaknesses of most of its African employees made teaching those skills
difficult. Widespread illiteracy had stalled components plant C’s attempt
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to devise a training programme. Note, moreover, that the problem was in
part created by the fact that, though most of the plants had increased the
educational requirements for hiring, the appalling quality of many schools
meant that Africans hired with an educational level that ought to indicate
literacy proved not to have the skill.
Finally, in particular in the two plants located in the Ciskei, managers
argued that, as well as educational deficiencies, the culture of their work-
force significantly reduced productivity. It would be easy to attribute this
to straightforward racism and dismiss it. However, not least because this
judgment is likely to have implications for future investment decisions, it
makes sense to consider it reasonably carefully. At specialty textile plant F
the manager thought that the egalitarian tradition among the Xhosa
population made it very difficult to persuade an African employee to take
a supervisory position. At textile plant E the manager attributed the high
rate of absenteeism to some unspecified component of culture. And he
said that his rural workforce was simply less conscientious than would be
Africans from Eastern Cape urban areas. At garment factory G the owner-
manager had had enormous difficulties coming to terms with his work-
force. He reported the same problems of absenteeism and conscientious-
ness and reported a complete collapse of work in the week preceding
Christmas.
What is to be made of these claims? First, some of the behaviour
reported was different from what one of the authors has observed in
North American plants. In one respect, this facilitated the task of
management. When both textile plant E and automobile plant B were
confronted with the need to cut employment they managed to do so by
offering severance packages, rather than laying off workers. The packages
were not particularly generous. Few North Americans would have
accepted them. But, despite the fact that the very high rate of unemploy-
ment in the region meant that the prospects of finding any other job, let
alone a comparable job, were remote, the take-up of the packages was
considerable. A possible interpretation of this is that most members of the
African population in the region are linked to extended networks of
mutual support (Wood and Haines 1995: 1–21). The primary burden in
supporting that network falls on the few members of it who are employed.
The high number of dependents per African worker and the very nature of
such informal networks would place extreme pressure on employed
members (see Hyden 1983: 69–71). Consequently, after ten or twenty
years employment, a member of the network might conclude that it was
time for someone else to look after them. This set of attitudes assisted
management in the process of reducing the labour force.
Second, whatever the cultural premises, there was evidence of remark-
able market sensitivity among African employees. This was particularly
evident at garment factory G. At the plant the work year ended shortly
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before Christmas and the plant closed for several weeks. Before returning
to the plant for the next year, many employees toured other garment
factories on the industrial estate and examined the wage bonuses offered
by them. Whether they returned to their previous employer depended on
what they found. Employees would also avoid agreeing to work overtime
on Saturdays, when the rate was lower, unless they could also be
guaranteed overtime on Sundays, when the rate was higher. The problem
of the collapse of effort before Christmas was solved by the introduction
of a superior performer’s bonus. Labour relations at this point were
certainly complicated by mistrust, and most of the workforce was
embedded in a larger network of mutual obligation than would normally
be the case in Europe or North America. But the sensitivity of the work-
force to incentives suggests the strong presence of more or less universal
motivations.
Moreover, while partly attributing the high rate of absenteeism to
cultural patterns, the managers all recognised that the problem was
exacerbated by the residence patterns inherited from apartheid. Many
African workers had to travel substantial distances to work and the length
of the journey, plus the uncertainties attached to the taxi system, explains
a large part of the incidence of absenteeism. As noted above, only
specialty textile plant F had managed to reduce its absentee rate, by
putting pressure on doctors. They respected the series of warnings
required by the 1995 law but, for repeat offenders, accumulated a dossier
that would sustain a dismissal. We return to this case shortly. The general
point here is that, while Xhosa culture may well influence employment
relations and management options, they do not absolutely prevent
managers from dealing with the problems of organising and motivating
labour.4 In fact, in at least one case, lay-offs, the culture seems to have
facilitated the task of managers.
Finally, what of the Workplace Forums whose intention was to facilitate
the pooling of concerns and expertise of workers and managers in the
solution of plant problems: to provide, in effect, an institutional basis for a
rebuilt community? In most of the plants that we visited management
would have liked to introduce them. But, under the law, the initiative
rested with the main union, and the African unions strongly opposed
them. This was because they saw them as potential rivals for influence in
the workplace. The majority unions were the primary interlocutors of
management in discussions of plant issues. A workplace forum would have
created space in the discussion for non-union employees, and (where they
existed) smaller unions of white artisans. The majority African unions did
not wish to concede influence to either group. Nor are structures of
codetermination readily accepted by a union membership imbued with a
culture that, as a result of the anti-apartheid struggle, is hostile to
capitalism in general, and to anything that might be seen as collaboration
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across classes, in particular. So far, only three Workplace Forums have
been established in South Africa, not one in the manufacturing sector.
Conclusion
Our data from a small sample of South African manufacturing plants
confirm the ‘hierarchical and authoritarian’ style of management identified
by others, with an important qualification. Before the changes that began
in the 1990s, and accelerated after the 1994 election, issues of flexibility
with respect to jobs occupied by Africans were dealt with through direct
(often rude and abrupt) command, reinforced with a fairly frequent use of
disciplinary dismissals. But white artisans could not be treated in this way.
The result was an organisation of production that combined the
inflexibilities sometimes associated with craft employment in the UK and
North America in a few jobs, with something like unlimited flexibility
across most other production jobs. In a central respect, however, flexibility
in the use of African employees was also limited. For, while neither law
nor union power effectively prevented managers from hiring, firing, and
redeploying African workers, what could be asked of them was greatly
restricted by their poor education and lack of training.
It is difficult to see how the limits on functional flexibility in the use of
artisan labour could be anything other than inefficient. These sorts of
limits are recognised as such in most contexts. What about the authori-
tarian approach to the black labour force? Was this also inefficient? The
case of speciality textiles plant F suggests that this might not be so.
Uniquely among the seven plants studied, F had always produced for
export. During the years that South African products were boycotted, it
had continued to export by falsifying documents. It was clear that it was
doing well. Sales had grown rapidly and it had been sufficiently profitable
to pay the one million dollar fine imposed on a US client when, a month
before the boycott was lifted, the client was caught. Its management
techniques had been as authoritarian as any other of the plants we visited.
And it had flourished. But the case of F indicates the specific conditions
under which this sort of policy will work. Plant F relied much less on
artisans than did more capital intensive plants; a large part of its labour
force could be paid on a piecework basis; and it produced for a niche
market in which product design was as important as cost. In these
respects it was distinguished from the other six plants, none of which had
all three of these characteristics. Like the other plants, however, this
management style was made possible by a political and legal context in
which the work force had little power.
That the authoritarian approach to management, combined with an
acceptance of craft inflexibility, was only feasible in these limited and
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specific contexts is suggested by the other six cases. The difficulties
showed up most acutely in process plant A, that produced a standard
commodity, with a significant artisan component of its work force, and a
technology that did not permit piece rates. As soon as it started to
confront international competition it had run into serious difficulties. But
most of the other plants exhibited these difficulties to varying degrees. Of
course, once the political changes heralded by the 1994 election pulled the
rug from under the authoritarian management style, any questions about
its efficiency were answered. With a workforce that had legal rights and
political power, mistrust became a major problem at the same time that
the weak educational background of the African labour force made
difficult the transition to more skilled and responsible work by them. The
cases studied here suggest that authoritarian management is only feasible
in limited and specific contexts.
Our findings can be used to speak to one of the standard issues in
South African social science, the connection between apartheid and
capitalism. The fact that the first two decades of apartheid (the 1950s and
1960s) coincided with fairly rapid economic growth led some to conclude
that the system constituted, from the point of view of capitalists, a
reasonably efficient method for managing a labour force. Or, the argu-
ment went further and claimed that apartheid’s migrant labour system was
distinctively suitable for supplying a cheap labour force. In this version
apartheid was simply an extreme manifestation, in an unusually congenial
political environment, of capitalist cost-minimisation.
Subsequent examination of the aggregate evidence tends to contradict
this view (Moll 1991; Nattress 1991). At a more micro level, the data
reported here suggest some of the obstacles to efficient operation thrown
up by apartheid. First, there is the mistrust alluded to above. While more
may sometimes be claimed for the productivity-enhancing effects of trust
than the evidence warrants, it is surely the case that its almost complete
absence complicates management. It had certainly done so in the plants
we visited. Second, even with the best of intentions on managers’ part, an
appalling education system for blacks limited management’s options with
respect to training and production organisation. Third, the attempt to
control black residence patterns, and keep blacks as separate from whites,
as possible, contributed to an absentee rate that raised production costs,
and rendered more difficult the development of the kind of black middle
class suburbs that might have allowed black supervisors to exercise
authority, relatively free from the risk of retaliation. Finally, while the
cultural differentness of the black workforce from its white counterparts is
probably exaggerated (the instances of sensitivity to incentives we
uncovered suggest that this is so), whatever cultural differences remain
(for instance, the obligations entailed in mutual support networks) were
clearly nurtured by the policies of apartheid. These were not uniformly
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negative in their effect. But, insofar as they were harmful, they rested in
part on the practices of apartheid.
Finally, maintaining satisfactory production levels after the political
change appeared only to be possible with the help of the trade unions.
The legacy of the previous management style was a well of mistrust that
expressed itself in both general uncooperativeness, and in odd incidents,
like the failure at textile plant E to accept that a pay error would be
corrected on the next working day. But, because of their role in the
struggle for democracy, the unions were trusted. Because unions provided
one of the few career routes available to Africans they also attracted the
more talented. Working through the unions was one of the few ways
available to managements to circumvent their own lack of credibility. This
put enormous strains on the local unions, strains that were compounded
by the fact that, in some places, the more talented and experienced union
leaders had been recruited away into political positions. At the time of our
interviews a burden was being placed that may have exceeded the bearing
capacity of local union officials.
Notes
1. Our intention was to interview larger numbers of union officials, but a legacy
of the apartheid years is considerable suspiciousness on the part of union
officials to white, university-based researchers.
2. The single exception was the garment factory (G), where there were four
black mechanics servicing the sewing and cutting machines that constituted
the bulk of the plant’s capital equipment. These mechanics did not, however,
have certified skills.
3. Absenteeism can, of course, be considered a form of protest, alternative to
striking (Cohen 1994: 135–149). Clearly, our research method did not permit
us to explore worker motivations for absence.
4. Although it clearly complicates things from time to time. At the automobile
assembly plant the following incident occurred. A male employee struck a
female employee. He was disciplined, but claimed that the incident was
‘cultural’. His claim had sufficient authority with some of his co-workers that
they went out on strike in protest at the disciplining. Possibly related to this
was the fact that the bulk of the female production employees at this plant had
been concentrated on a separate assembly line, rather remote from the main
production floor.
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